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August 14, 2000
Jim Sylph
International Federation of Accountants
535 Fifth Avenue - 26th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Comment Letter on June 2000 Exposure Draft, "Independence Proposed Changes to the Code of Ethics for Professional
Accountants"
Dear Mr. Sylph:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on your June 2000
Exposure Draft (the “ED”). Please understand that these
comments represent solely the views of the staff rather than those
of the Independence Standards Board, which has not considered
the issues and develops its positions only after extensive due
process and deliberation.
Our overall impression is that the draft is very well done, and we
congratulate the IFAC Ethics Committee for a high quality
product.
We will respond first to your broad questions (a) and (b), and
then comment on other matters in the ED, generally in the order
in which they appear.
1. Your Question (a) - Whether the change from a prescriptive
approach to an approach that sets out a framework of risks
and safeguards is acceptable We agree with this proposed change, and are developing a
similar approach. As you know, we are well along in our
project to develop a conceptual framework for auditor
independence, and are currently evaluating comments on our
discussion memorandum on this subject.
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2. Your Question (b) - Whether the risks identified in this exposure draft are
considered serious and whether the safeguards identified are adequate Overall, we believe IFAC has done a good job of describing the independence
threats, but the discussion of safeguards should be expanded. Some
suggestions are included in our detailed comments that follow.
3. Restriction of auditors with respect to certain other client-related entities We believe it would be helpful for you to define additional related entities,
beyond the "assurance client," from which independence would be required.
While such relationships occasionally are mentioned in your detail (e.g., the
mention of parents and subsidiaries in 8.106), a more comprehensive
treatment is needed. For example, what about significant investors or
investees? Directors?
4. Requiring in your definition of "independence" the "ability to demonstrate"
the appropriate limitation of risks to the "appearance" of independence We agree with the general thrust of your definition of independence, including
the reference to independence in appearance. We question, however, the
language requiring an auditor to be able to demonstrate that an “informed
third party would not reasonably question” an auditor’s independence. An
“ability to demonstrate” may become an issue in litigation and enforcement
actions. Would the auditor have to conduct an opinion survey “to be able to
demonstrate” how an “informed third party” would view something? Our
own research, and responses we have obtained from seemingly informed third
parties to our discussion memoranda and exposure drafts, have indicated that
reasonable, informed people can reach different conclusions on the same set
of facts.
We would suggest instead that the auditor be required, when there is no
specific guidance on point, to consider how, in the auditor’s view, an
informed third party would view a situation. This language we believe makes
the standard operational for an auditor and reduces the risk of inappropriate
after-the-fact second-guessing. You use language consistent with our view in
8.5 (“so that [reporting accountants] can decide”) but in 8.3 you say “ the
significance of economic and financial interests should always be measured in
light of what an informed party may consider reasonable or acceptable”
[emphasis added]. We also believe this language needs attention since we do
not know how a reporting accountant can “measure” what someone else
“may” consider reasonable.
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We strongly agree with the last sentence of 8.6 – that knowledge, or
reasonable expectation of knowledge, of a relationship by the auditor is
necessary to compromise independence. This has been an issue for many
years, and we are using similar language in our standards.
5. Definition of the "reporting accountant" We believe that "the firm" itself should be included in the definition of the
"reporting accountant." Also, additional guidance likely is needed with
respect to some of the alternative practice structures now appearing in the
United States, as described in our recent Discussion Memorandum No. 99-2,
"Evolving Forms of Firm Structure and Organization."
In addition, we suggest that the phrase "in a position to influence the audit"
include those partners and managerial employees who provide only non-audit
services to the client. The ISB has done this because, at least under U.S.
generally accepted auditing standards, the auditor is required to discuss
matters that may affect the audit with firm personnel responsible for non-audit
services to the entity, and the Board did not want an independence issue to
impact the candor of those discussions.
Further, we are not sure what is intended by the phrase “directly influence.”
We believe the ability to influence should be the criterion without trying to
determine if it is directly or indirectly. Similarly, in 8.1, the term “direct
management responsibility” could be read to exclude the chain of command,
which we believe would be a mistake.
6. Objective of the guidance –
In 8.7, your draft states that “The objective of this guidance is to assist
reporting accountants in evaluating …” We believe that the intended audience
should be substantially broader. That is, it should assist not only reporting
accountants, but also regulators, audit committee members, client
management, and other stakeholders in auditor independence.
Also, 8.7(a) states that “any risks to independence are clearly insignificant.”
Rather, in some cases the threats themselves could be significant, but the
application of safeguards sufficiently mitigates those threats to reduce the
remaining independence risk to an insignificant level.
7. The “self-interest risk” –
8.12(b) prohibits a loan to an “owner” of an assurance client. We suggest that
be limited to a “significant” owner (greater than five percent? twenty
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percent?). Otherwise loans, including publicly issued debt, held by the auditor
in a nominal shareholder of an audit client, could be deemed an impairment.
8. The “self-review risk”
In 8.13(b) we again question the use of the term “directly.”
9. Safeguards –
8.18 describes a number of possible safeguards, in several categories. We
would add these: a) establish a “tone from the top” supportive of auditor
independence, both within the firm of the reporting accountant and within the
client’s corporate goverance structure; b) consult within the firm; and c) foster
communication between the auditor and the audit committee as described in
our ISB Standard No. 1.
In addition, the introduction states: “Safeguards should be recognized and
acknowledged as preserving the reporting accountant’s independence.”
“Preserving” implies acceptability; would a word like “promoting” be better
(i.e., helping, but not necessarily achieving)?
10. Financial involvement with the client and family relationships –
As to guidance in 8.102 on other close relatives, we believe “materiality” for
investments of other close relatives should be measured both with respect to
the relative and to the partner or firm employee. This is intended to address
cases where an “other close relative” has an investment in a client which is
material to the family member, but which is immaterial to the firm
professional. For example, an adult child of the audit partner could have an
investment in the audit client that is very material to the child, but is
immaterial to the partner. We believe that even if the partner were aware of
the investment, it would not affect his or her behavior. On the other hand, we
agree that an investment that is immaterial to the other close relative does not
represent a threat to the independence of the auditor, even if the amount would
be material to the auditor.
The second to last bullet in 8.103 suggests “removing the individual
professional who has received the financial interest from all direct
participation in the engagement.” We believe the person should also not be
“in any other position of influence over the engagement.”
8.119 seems to have a narrow definition of “officer.” We believe it should
include all officers of an entity who have policy-making authority. We also
believe that no one on the engagement or in a position to influence the audit
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should have a close relative (not just an immediate family member) in one of
those positions, or in other positions described in 8.119. We do not believe
that any safeguard short of prohibition would be effective, or be seen to be
effective.
Further, 8.120 – 122 describe employment restrictions for relatives, but we
believe the restrictions should be strengthened. Specifically, for immediate
family members of those on the audit, we believe all client employment
presents a self-interest threat to independence. This is because such
employment is considered too likely to create financial or emotional ties to the
client which are not appropriate for the auditor.
11. Business relationships with a client –
We agree with the 8.104 description of client business relationships, but
believe this guidance should be broadened. For example, many other types of
business relationships exist that are of concern, such as a strategic alliance.
Also, we believe the “significance” exemption of 8.104 should be limited to
category (b). Similarly, we object to the exemption proposed in 8.105: other
than in identified “grandfathered” or deposit account situations, the auditor
should not borrow from client banks because of the possibility of client
influence through the loan.
12. Serving as an officer or on the board of an assurance client 8.106 proscribes the reporting accountant from serving as an officer or
director of the client. It does not seem to prohibit other partners (or other
employees) from being a client officer or director, but we believe it should.
13. Providing other services to the client –
A. Bookkeeping – 8.111 indicates that the auditor can help discharge the
client’s bookkeeping responsibility as long as he or she doesn’t make
management decisions. We believe such services are problematic even
absent making management decisions because they introduce possible
self-review and self-interest risks. However, we believe it is not
necessary to deem independence impaired if the bookkeeping service
includes activities that are immaterial (in the aggregate) to the financial
statements being reported on.
B. Valuations – 8.113 similarly implies that management acceptance of full
responsibility for an auditor’s valuation, plus safeguards, may overcome
the independence threat. For material valuations, we believe the threats
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(including self-review and self-interest) are fundamental, and that
prohibition is appropriate.
C. Acting for the client in the resolution of a dispute or litigation - We
suggest that the language of 8.114 “accountants assist their assurance
clients” be used rather than the “act for a client” wording (used in the title
and 8.115-.116), which implies assuming a management and decisionmaking role.
14. Former partners –
Please see our recently issued ISB Standard No. 3, “Employment with Audit
Clients.” In particular, please note that our cash-out provisions extend in
some cases to more than those individuals included in your definition of the
“reporting accountant.”
15. Long association of senior personnel with assurance clients –
The second sentence of 8.127 states that: “This risk is actually more
perceived than real.” We urge the deletion of this statement – we believe the
threat of over-familiarity with the client described in 8.15 could be real in
these circumstances.
16. Fees – relative size –
Since the reporting accountant is defined to include the partner in charge of
the audit, it may not be possible, or desirable, to meet the conditions of
8.128/9. That is, the most effective audit may require the partner to devote his
full time efforts to that assignment. In those situations, the firm will need to
develop safeguards to avoid or mitigate any concerns about dependence of the
audit partner on the client.
17. Fee – Other services
8.131 states that “Independence may be compromised when fees are earned
from an assurance client for non-audit services,” but this doesn’t clearly
communicate what the threat to independence is.
18. Actual or threatened litigation –
8.138 states that the primary question regarding litigation is whether the
auditor can “continue to assume management’s good faith.” We believe the
key concern in such cases is the continued complete candor in auditor-client
communications. When the client commences, or expresses the intention to
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commence, legal action against the auditor, the auditor and the client
management may be placed in adversarial positions in which the
management’s willingness to make complete disclosures and the auditor’s
objectivity may be affected by self-interest.

Again, we compliment you on the quality of the exposure draft and in particular
the framework you have adopted.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at any time.
Sincerely,

Arthur Siegel
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